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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
State of Utah, No. 20000026 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
F I L E D 
Russell Eugene Bisner, 
Defendant and Appellant. November 20, 2001 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
Attorneys: Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Jeffrey W. Gray, Asst. 
Att'y Gen., Robert L. Stott, Lana Taylor, for 
plaintiff 
Richard P. Mauro, Michael R. Sikora, for defendant 
RUSSON, Associate Chief Justice: 
11 Defendant Russell Eugene Bisner ("Bisner") appeals from 
convictions of murder, a first degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1999), and aggravated robbery, also a 
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 
(1999). We affirm, 
BACKGROUND 
I. FACTS 
12 On the night of January 5, 1999, sometime between 9:00 
and 10:30, Bisner and his friend Derek Pearson ("Pearson") 
visited Christopher Lyman ("Lyman") at Lyman's apartment to 
purchase LSD. While at Lyman's apartment, Bisner told Lyman that 
he was going to meet somebody later that night who owed him 
"something in th[e] area" of $300. Then, as Bisner and Pearson 
left Lyman's apartment, Bisner declared, "Somebody is going to 
die tonight." 
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Ti3 After leaving Lyman's residence, Bisner and Pearson 
proceeded to tne heme of Justin Koontz ("Koontz"), where they 
gathered with several other friends to "hang[] out" and 
"party[]." At the party, the friends consumed alcohol and used 
various illegal drugs, including marijuana and LSD. During one 
of the conversations at the party, Bisner mentioned to his 
friends that he was owed a $350 drug debt by Darby Golub 
("Golub"). Shortly thereafter, Bisner telephoned Golub and left 
him a message that the drug debt was supposed to have been paid 
that day. Subsequently, at approximately 2:00 on the morning of 
January 6, Golub called Koontz's house. Golub first spoke with 
Koontz, and after an angry exchange then spoke with Dustin Symes 
("Symes"), another of Bisner's friends attending the party. 
Golub and Symes also engaged in a vehement argument about the 
late nature of the calls to the respective residences. This 
conversation ended with the parties agreeing to meet at a nearby 
strip mall to settle the dispute. 
H4 Following his conversation with Golub, Symes informed 
Bisner, Koontz, and Pearson of the result of the discussion. 
Anticipating a fight, the four considered but eventually decided 
against taking guns with them to the strip mall. Instead, they . 
quickly left in Symes's truck to meet Golub. 
fS When the friends arrived at the strip mall, Golub was 
not there. Symes therefore drove his truck to a neighboring 
convenience store where Koontz's mother was working and from 
which the strip mall could be seen. Approximately five minutes 
later, Golub arrived and parked his own truck in the parking lot 
of the strip mall. Upon seeing this, Symes called, "There he 
is." The four friends waiting at the convenience store then 
reentered Symes's truck and drove together to the strip mall. 
116 At the strip mall, Symes parked his truck approximately 
twenty feet from Golub's truck. After Symes parked, Golub 
stepped just outside of his truck and stood alone with an assault 
rifle cradled in his arms. Bisner and his friends then exited 
Symes's truck and advanced on Golub. As the group approached, 
Golub backed away, neither firing his rifle nor threatening to do 
so. Then, Symes, who was carrying an aluminum baseball bat, 
thrust the bat at Golub, cutting his head, knocking him down, and 
causing him to drop the assault rifle. Koontz followed Symes's 
lead by punching Golub in the leg. Golub responded to this 
attack with confusion, asking, "Why are you doing this?" 
17 Having disarmed Golub, Koontz and Symes retreated to 
Symes's vehicle. Meanwhile, Bisner and Pearson remained at 
Golub's truck, forcing him to the ground and beating on him for 
approximately thirty to forty-five seconds. At that point, Symes 
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yeiLea for his friends to return to the vehicle. Pearson 
complied with Sym.es' s request, and just as he, Kccntz, and Symes 
were climbing into their vehicle, Golub lifted himself from the 
ground and began speeding away in his truck. As Golub began to 
flee, Bisner took the assault rifle from the ground, cocked it, 
and fired three times at Golub. Bisner's shots missed, but as 
Golub continued to speed away through the parking lot, Bisner 
fired the rifle three additional times. One of those rounds 
struck Golub in the back of the head and killed him. 
118 Less than an hour later, at approximately 2:40 a.m., 
Sandy City Police Officer Greg Severson (''Officer Severson") 
arrived at the strip mall in response to the shooting. At the 
scene, Officer Severson learned from Koontz's mother, who 
remained at the convenience store, that Bisner, Koontz, Pearson, 
and Symes had been involved in a confrontation that ultimately 
led to the shooting. Accordingly, Officer Severson proceeded to 
Koontz's home, where Koontz and Pearson were taken into custody. 
While at the Koontz residence, Officer Severson further learned 
that Bisner had just telephoned Koontz. Using the number that 
Bisner had called from, which was recorded on the Koontzes' 
caller identification service, Officer Severson obtained Bisner's 
address and traveled there with another Sandy City.officer and 
three sheriff's deputies. 
19 The police arrived at Bisner's home at approximately 
5:00 a.m. They then secured the premises, called Bisner on the 
telephone, and took him into custody at gunpoint after he exited 
the house. With Bisner safely in custody, Officer Severson and 
the Sandy City officer accompanying him holstered their weapons 
and approached the house to speak with Bisner's mother. The two 
officers explained that they were still looking for one suspect 
involved in the shooting and asked Bisner's mother for permission 
to search her home. Bisner's mother gave her permission for the 
search, telling the two officers to "go ahead." 
$10 Beginning their search, the two officers moved to the 
basement of the house, where, Bisner's mother had informed them, 
Bisner lived. Bisner's room had been created at the end of a 
hallway in the basement, and was separated from the adjoining 
room by a cloth that had been draped from the ceiling and hung 
the length of the wall. As the officers descended the stairway 
into the basement, Officer Severson observed through an opening 
in this draped entry to Bisner's bedroom a shotgun and an assault 
rifle resting in a gun rack on the floor of the room. In the 
basement, Officer Severson also examined, but did not enter, a 
doorless closet leading out of the hallway adjacent to Bisner's 
room. However, seeing "just clothing" inside the closet, the 
officers proceeded to search the house for Symes. 
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311 Having cleared the house for any possible suspects, 
Officer Severson determined an additional search would be 
necessary due to his discovery of the two weapons in Bisner's 
room. Officer Severson therefore contacted his commanding 
officer and requested that a detective be sent to assist him in 
the search. While Officer Severson was waiting for the detective 
to arrive, he obtained a "permission to search" form from his 
patrol car and requested that Bisner's mother sign it so that he 
could again search her home. The form stated in pertinent part: 
Knowing of my . . . CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT not 
to have a search made of the premises and 
property owned by me [without a search "1' 
warrant] . . . , I willingly give my 
permission to the above named officer (s) to 
conduct a complete search of the premises and 
property, including all buildings and 
vehicles, both inside and outside of the 
property [referred to herein]. 
Bisner's mother read the permission form and signed.it at 
approximately 5:30 a.m. Bisner's sister, who had been present 
throughout both the search and her mother's conversations with 
Officer Severson, also signed the form as a witness thereto. 
112 When Detective Mark Soper ("Detective Soper") arrived 
at approximately 5:35 a.m., Officer Severson advised him of the 
progress of the search. Detective Soper then asked to speak 
privately with Bisner's mother. During their conversation, 
Detective Soper reviewed the permission to search form that she 
had signed. Bisner's mother reaffirmed that she had read and 
signed the form, and indicated that she did not have any 
questions about its meaning. Detective Soper then verbally 
requested permission to search her home, and Bisner's mother 
again consented to the search. However, Bisner's mother further 
advised Detective Soper that Bisner was "supposed to pay rent" 
for his room but had not done so for "the last two months because 
he was unemployed." 
113 Upon learning of Bisner's arrangement to pay rent to 
his mother for use of his room, Detective Soper determined that 
he would search the house without entering the areas occupied 
exclusively by Bisner until he could obtain a search warrant 
allowing him to do so. Commencing his search, Detective Soper, 
like Officer Severson, was able to view through an opening in the 
draped entry to Bisner's room the shotgun and assault rifle 
discovered there in the earlier search. Detective Soper also 
examined, but did not enter, the doorless closet near Bisner's 
room. Looking into the closet, Detective Soper saw various 
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clothing that matched a description of Bisner's a::::e from • 
day of the shooting. Partially underneath some of the cicth: 
Detective Scper observed the "black stock" of what "appeared 
be [the mid-section of] an assault-type rifle " 
(
:I14 Subsequently, at approximately 10:30 that morning, 
Detective Soper obtained a duly executed search warrant 
commanding a daytime search of Eisner's residence for, among 
other things, M[a]ny firearms," "\[a]ny ammunition,"' "[ajny spent 
shell casings," the clothes Bisner was described to have been 
wearing just prior to the shooting, and n[a]ny other fruits or 
instrumentalities that are evidence of the crime of criminal 
homicide." Using this search warrant, Detective Soper returned 
to Bisner's basement bedroom and confiscated various evidence, 
including the shotgun and assault rifle seen in Bisner's room and 
the assau11 rif1e in the nearby closet. Ihe assau11 rif1e 
confiscated from Bisner's closet was the weapon used to kill 
Golub. 
4ISTORY 
115 D- :-3"uar> * w x^r. -..c ^ tate charged Bxsner by 
information -L::* murder and aggravated robbery, both first degree 
felonies. _n February 22 ! '*z j Bisner served the State with a 
written request for aiscc^i, In the inter rogatory, Bisner 
requested prcducti~n ~f s—— j ctner "hiriq.*, * 
[..is: ;: s„i witnesses the [S]tate intends 
t- -ail at The preliminary .tearing, including 
information regarding the details of 
any cooperation agreements written or 
unwritten; oetween either police officer[s] 
or tne [district attorney]'s office and 
potent .3 1 witnesses, including offers of 
immunity, offers :f Len:en:y[,| cr :ther 
incentives designed to eiint cooperation 
such as :he threat T" cr-s*3 ~ut f i onl f^ r the 
hcmici::e as a par* 
The State ar.^er-c :.n.i reques- . .:a.ch 16, 1999, noting, " rhe 
State has n.* yet determined i:s witnesses for the preliminary 
hearing," : 
HI6 On May 10, 1999, Bisner next requested from the State 
production of a "[1 ] i st of a 1 1 witnesses the State intends to 
call at trial, including any information regarding the 
detail of any written or oral cooperation agreement between any 
police agency or officer, the State [,] and potential witnesses." 
The State answered this request on May 18, 1999, informing Bisner 
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!% 
that i: wculd provide its list of likely witnesses vv [wjhen . . . 
finalized." 
1117 Subsequently, on May 11, 1999, Eisner moved the trial 
court to "suppress all evidence found in [Bisner]'s house, 
including the gun allegedly used by him in this case." According 
to the motion, all of the evidence seized from Bisner's residence 
was inadmissible since the search warrant Detective Soper used to 
confiscate the evidence was based on information gained during 
Officer Severson's "warrantless search," which violated Bisner's 
Fourth Amendment right against unlawful searches and seizures. 
In response to this motion, the State argued that Detective 
Soper's search warrant was valid and constitutional because it 
was obtained only on the basis of information gathered during 
searches conducted with the express consent of Bisner's mother, 
who owned the home at issue. 
118 On May 17, 1999, the trial court held a preliminary 
hearing to consider Bisner's motion to suppress the evidence 
obtained from his residence. After considering evidence on the 
matter from both sides, the court denied Bisner's motion to 
suppress, concluding that his mother, as owner of the house, 
voluntarily consented to both of the pre-warrant searches that 
yielded the information from which Detective Soper ultimately 
obtained his search warrant and seized the evidence at issue. In 
its subsequent findings of fact and conclusions of law on the 
matter, the trial court found: 
[Bisner's mother] gave her permission . . . 
[for the officers] to make a cursory search 
of her home to determine if any other 
suspects were inside. . . . [Following this 
preliminary search, Bisner's mother again] 
willingly gave her permission for the police 
to complete a search of her premises and 
property and to take any property which they 
desired as evidence. 
The court therefore ruled, "From the totality of circumstances, 
[Bisner's mother]'s consent to search on both occasions was given 
voluntarily. . . . [Thus,] [b]oth pre-warrant searches conducted 
by Officer Severson and Detective Soper were valid and lawful. 
Neither violated any of the defendant's constitutional rights." 
519 Thereafter, on August 19, 1999, less than a week before 
trial, Bisner moved to exclude "[a]ny evidence as to a monetary 
debt from a drug deal" between Bisner and Golub. In support of 
thi's motion, Bisner asserted that evidence of the drug debt was 
irrelevant, constituted "inadmissible character evidence" 
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cursua" :: "Jtah Rule of Evidence 404(b), and was thus x: 
prejudicial than probative. 
120 Then, approximately three days before trial, 3: 
attorney learned that Lyman might have entered into two 
agreements with the prosecution for his testimony in Bisner's 
trial. Specifically, after learning from the State that Lyman 
would be testifying at trial, 
A defense investigator contacted Lyman to 
discuss his expected testimony and learned 
that at the time Lyman first spoke to police 
he had a pending misdemeanor charge, and that 
after he gave his statement [to the police], 
someone spoke to the judge on his behalf and 
he got eight days off of a ten day sentence, 
the dismissal of a fine[,] and "something 
else," 
Bisner's attorney suspected that the "something else" referred to 
by Lyman possibly included a "no prosecution" agreement from the 
State on potential drug distribution charges arising out of his 
sale of LSD to Bisner and Pearson. Accordingly, on the first day 
of trial, August 24, 1999, Bisner moved to have the trial court 
exclude the testimony of "any [Sjtate witness [for] whom the 
State has not provided full disclosure of any agreements, 
inducements, offers of leniency, or other understandings that the 
witness would receive some benefit for cooperating or testifying" 
in Bisner's trial. The basis for this motion was that by failing 
to disclose any cooperation agreements it had made, the State 
violated Bisner's due process rights in contradiction to Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
121 After the jury had been impaneled for trial, the trial 
court conducted a hearing on Bisner's motion to exclude evidence 
of the drug debt Golub owed Bisner. Ruling that the drug debt 
evidence was admissible to demonstrate "the purpose of th[e] 
gathering that resulted in Golub's death," the trial court denied 
Bisner's motion. 
122 At trial, the State first called Lyman to the witness 
stand. On cross-examination, Bisner's attorney questioned Lyman 
at length about any incentive he received for testifying in 
Bisner's trial. Bisner's attorney first asked Lyman whether he 
had received "any sort of a deal" for testifying, and Lyman 
responded: "No, I was not given immunity or any kind of written 
statement . . . that I would not be prosecuted." Bisner's 
attorney then questioned Lyman about any incentives he had 
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received fcr giving his statement concerning the case to the 
police. Lyman stated: 
When I gave the statement [to the police], 
there really was no agreement. They told me 
[that they] couldn't promise anything . . . , 
[that] they wouldn't even be able to tell me 
whether or not they could knock any time off. 
I basically told [them] what I told you so 
far[,] and they said they'd see what they 
could do. I wasn't guaranteed anything at 
the time of the statement. 
However, after further questioning Lyman admitted that for giv 
his statement to the police, he did eventually have to serve o 
"two days [in jail] instead of ten da/s" for a misdemeanor he 
committed in events unrelated to Goluc's death, and that he 
"apparently" also avoided imposition of a fine for that crime. 
1123 As a result of this admission, Bisner moved the tria 
court to strike Lyman's testimony from the record, Bisner's 
attorney argued: 
The [basis] for the motion . . . to strike 
the testimony of Chris Lyman [is] on due 
process grounds due to an undisclosed 
cooperation agreement for his testimony 
. . . . [T]here is a . . . dispute as to 
whether there was any deal in this case. The 
Prosecutor has indicated to me that there was 
none. The evidence elicited from Chris Lyman 
himself was that there was none. [But i]t is 
my view that his testimony indicates a de 
facto deal. 
Mr. Lyman agreed that he stated to my 
investigator that there was [a] . . . jail 
sentence that he got help on, a fine, and 
something else . . . . [And] I believe that 
. . . Mr. Lyman was told, perhaps through 
counsel, that he would not be prosecuted for 
certain admitted drug distribution charges 
[arising from his sale of LSD to Bisner and 
Pearson], which would be second degree 
felonies. 
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The Stale then responded to this argument, attesting that ic -ad 
not abstained from prosecuting Lyman in exchange for his 
testimony: 
Yes, LMr. Lyman's attorney was concerned [that 
Lyman would be prosecuted for drug 
distribution based on his testimony at 
trial]. I told him simply that because we 
. . . had no . . . corpus of this crime, we 
wouldn't be able to prosecute his client 
because we had no evidence other than his 
statements that there was a crime committed. 
So there was no inducement. I didn't promise 
him I wouldn't prosecute him for his 
testimony. I just told him a simple fact[:] 
I couldn't prosecute him. 
After considering this evidence, the trial court denied Bisner's 
motion to strike Lyman's testimony. Finding that Bisner's 
attorney knew of any potential agreement between Lyman and the 
authorities involved in his unrelated misdemeanor charge prior to 
trial—and that it was "quite clear" Lyman had not received "an 
inducement encouraging him to testify" from the State—the court 
concluded, "I am just not persuaded that there has been a [due 
process] violation [in this case] . . . ." The court therefore 
also denied a motion for directed verdict Bisner had made on the 
basis that without Lyman's testimony, the State could only prove 
Bisner had committed manslaughter and not murder because intent 
could not be established. 
524 Bisner then rested without presenting evidence, and the 
jury was sent out. Following its deliberations, the jury found 
Bisner guilty of both murder and aggravated robbery. The jury 
further found that Bisner had used a dangerous weapon in the 
commission of Golub's murder. 
525 Subsequently, on September 14, 1999, Bisner moved the 
trial court to merge his aggravated robbery and murder 
convictions. To support this motion, Bisner argued that despite 
this court's holding to the contrary in State v. McCovey, 803 
P.2d 1234 (Utah 1990), "aggravated robbery is a lesser included 
offense of murder," and thus, he could not "be convicted of both 
offenses" pursuant to section 76-1-402(3) of the Utah Code. 
Relying on McCovey, the court denied Bisner's motion. 
526 Thereafter, on October 1, 1999, the trial court 
sentenced Bisner to an indeterminate prison term of not less than 
five years for murder and not less than five years for aggravated 
9 No. 20000026 
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robbery, with a one-year dangerous firearm enhancement in the 
commission of murder, all sentences running consecutively. 
127 Following his sentencing, Bisner moved for a new trial 
on the ground that the State violated his due process rights by 
"failfing] to disclose a cooperation agreement for Chris Lyman 
. . . in which the State agreed not to prosecute Lyman for drug 
distribution charges." The court denied Eisner's motion for a 
new trial in a ruling dated November 23, 1999. 
128 Accordingly, on December 1, 1999, Bisner moved the 
trial court to reconsider his motion for a new trial pursuant to"* 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 24. To support this motion, 
Bisner argued first that his previous motion "was denied without 
the hearing requested," and second, that he subsequently 
"obtained new evidence that the State also failed to disclose 
cooperation agreements" with Koontz and Pearson. 
529 However, before the trial court could rule on Bisner's 
motion to reconsider, he appealed his conviction on December 30, 
1999. Then, attempting to obtain a ruling on his motion to 
reconsider, Bisn.er moved to have his appeal dismissed without 
prejudice, and we denied his motion in an order dated August 31, 
2000: 
Defendant's motion to dismiss this appeal 
without prejudice while the trial court 
considers defendant's motion to reconsider 
. . . is denied. . . . Dismissal of this 
appeal would necessarily be with prejudice, 
resulting in loss of defendant's appeal. The 
trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider 
anything further in this case because 
defendant timely filed his notice of appeal 
on December 30, 1999. 
Consequently, Bisner's appeal of his conviction is now before us. 
ANALYSIS 
130 On appeal, Bisner raises numerous claims of error: 
(1) that the trial court erred by refusing to grant a new trial, 
since the State violated Bisner's due process rights by failing 
to disclose its alleged cooperation agreements with Koontz, 
Lyman, Pearson, and Symes; (2) that the court committed 
reversible error by failing to exclude from evidence all 
information obtained pursuant to Detective Soper's search 
warrant, which Bisner contends was gained "in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment"; (3) that the court erred by refusing to 
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exclude eviaer.ee of the drug debt Golub owed Bisner; (4) that the 
court misled the jury by giving a "confusing" instruction 
concerning the necessity of convicting Bisner of manslaughter 
rather than murder if he was found to have been acting "under an 
extreme emotional disturbance"; and (5) that the trial court 
should have merged his charges for aggravated robbery and murder. 
We address each issue in turn. 
I. DUE PROCESS 
H31 Bisner first contends that by failing to disclose 
alleged cooperation agreements it entered into with Koontz, 
Lyman, Pearson, and Symes, the State violated his due process 
right to a fair trial, and thus, the trial court should have 
granted his motion for a new trial made on that basis. "When 
reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial, we 
will not reverse 'absent a clear abuse of discretion by the trial 
court.'" State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, 5 12, 994 P.2d 177 
(quoting State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 265-66 (Utah 1998)); see 
also State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, 1 28, 979 P.2d 799; State v. 
Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 1992). At the same time, 
however, we review the legal standards applied by the trial court 
in denying such a motion for correctness. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45 at 
1 28; see also State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991). 
1132 Under both the Utah and United States Constitutions, 
the prosecution bears a "fundamental'' duty "to disclose material, 
exculpatory evidence to the defense" in criminal cases. Bakalov, 
1999 UT 45 at 1 30. This duty, enunciated first by the United 
States Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 
(1963), arises regardless of whether the defense requests 
production of the favorable evidence at issue, United States v. 
Baaley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985), since failure to disclose such 
evidence "violates due process . . . irrespective of the good 
faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
Likewise, the duty applies both to substantively exculpatory 
evidence and to that which may be used for impeachment. Baaley, 
473 U.S. at 676; Gialio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 
(1972); Bakalov, 1999 UT 45 at f 30. 
133 Despite the strictures imposed on prosecutors by this 
constitutional duty of disclosure, the United States Supreme 
Court has held that it is in the specific instance where there is 
"discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to 
the prosecution but unknown to the defense" that reversal of a 
conviction for nondisclosure is required. United States v. 
Aaurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (emphasis added); see also Baalev, 
473 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, courts universally refuse to 
overturn convictions where the evidence at issue is known to the 
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defense prior ~o or during trial, where the defendant reasonably 
should have known of the evidence, or where the defense had the 
opportunity to use the evidence to its advantage during trial but 
failed to do so.1 As the Sixth Circuit held in United States v. 
Mull ins, 
1
 See, e.g., United States v. Wadlincton, 233 F.3d 1067, 
1076 (8th Cir. 2000) (refusing to find a Brady violation where 
the defendant "was already aware of the substance of the 
[undisclosed] statements prior to trial"); United States v. — 
Quintanilla, 193 F.3d 1139, 1149 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that a 
defendant's "independent awareness of the exculpatory evidence is 
critical" because "[i]f a defendant already has a particular 
piece of evidence/' production by the prosecution "is considered 
cumulative"); Rector v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 551, 560 (5th Cir. 
1997) (finding that evidence is not suppressed if the defendant 
"knew, or should have known of the essential facts permitting him 
to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence"); United States v. 
Zackson, 6 F.3d 911, 919 (2d Cir. 1993) (rejecting a claim of a 
Brady violation because the defendant "was . . . aware that [a 
witness's] cooperation may have warranted some additional 
investigation"); United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 764 (9th 
Cir. 1991) ("When . . . a defendant has enough information to be 
able to ascertain the supposed Brady material on his own, there 
is no suppression by the government."); United States v. Perdomo, 
929 F.2d 967, 973 (3d Cir. 1991) (employing the Rector standard); 
United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir. 1991) (using 
the Mullins standard); United States v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378, 380 
(4th Cir. 1990) (following the Eleventh Circuit's approach in 
Davis); United States v. Pandozzi, 878 F.2d 1526, 1528 (1st Cir. 
1989) (finding no Brady violation where defense could have 
obtained the information "'with any reasonable diligence'" 
(quoting Jarrell v. Balkcom, 735 F.2d 1242, 1258 (11th Cir. 
1984)); United States v. Adams, 834 F.2d 632, 634 (7th Cir. 1987) 
("Brady . . . does not mandate pretrial disclosure. Instead, 
'the appropriate standard to be applied . . . is whether the 
disclosure came so late as to prevent the defendant from 
receiving a fair trial.'" (citations omitted)); United States v. 
Davis, 787 F.2d 1501, 1505 (11th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he Bradv rule 
does not apply if the evidence in question is available to the 
defendant from other sources."); Xydas v. United States, 445 F.2d 
660, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that the prosecution's failure 
"to disclose the contested grand jury statement was not 
reversible error, since under the circumstances . . . reasonable 
pre-trial preparation by the defense would either have confirmed, 
denied, or rendered immaterial" the evidence in dispute). 
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:Tjhe government's failure to disclose 
potentially exculpatory information does not 
violate Brady "where a defendant 'knew or 
should have known the essential facts 
permitting him to take advantage of any 
exculpatory information,' or where the 
evidence is available to defendant from 
another source." 
22 F.3d 1365, 1371 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. 
Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States 
v. Grossman, 843 F.2d 78, 85 (2d Cir. 1988))). Indeed, any 
mandate to the contrary would belie the fundamental objective of 
the prosecution's duty to disclose, for the purpose of this 
requirement is to ensure a fair trial. The United States Supreme 
Court has itself observed: "[The] purpose [of the Brady rule] is 
not to displace the adversary system as the primary means by 
which truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of 
justice does not occur. Thus, the prosecutor is not required to 
deliver his entire file to defense counsel, but only to disclose 
evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial [.]" Baoley, 473 U.S. at 
675 (footnotes omitted); see also United States v. LeRoy, 687 
F.2d 610, 619 (2d Cir. 1982). In short, a Brady violation occurs 
only where the state suppresses information that (1) remains 
unknown to the defense both before and throughout trial and 
(2) is material and exculpatory, meaning its disclosure would 
have created a "reasonable probability" that "the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." Baaley, 473 U.S. at 682. 
134 In this case, Bisner contends that the State committed 
multiple due process violations in contravention to the Brady 
rule, requiring us to overturn his convictions on appeal. 
Specifically, Bisner argues that the State failed to disclose 
cooperation agreements it allegedly entered into with a number of 
its witnesses, including Lyman, and also Koontz, Pearson, and 
Symes. 
A. Nondisclosure of the Alleged Agreement with Lyman 
135 Bisner asserts that the State failed to disclose two 
separate incentives it allegedly provided to Lyman for testifying 
in Bisner's trial: first, a reduction in the jail time Lyman was 
required to serve and the fine he was ordered to pay for an 
unrelated misdemeanor he committed, and second, a "promise not to 
prosecute" Lyman for selling Bisner and Pearson LSD on the night 
of Golub's death. According to Bisner, the State's failure to 
disclose these alleged incentives "is reversible error." 
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7L3S However, as explained above, prosecutorial 
nondisclosure of information favorable to the accused does net by 
itself constitute prejudicial error requiring reversal of a 
conviction. See, e.g., Baaley. 473 U.S. at 675; LeRoy, 687 F.2d 
at 619. Rather, nondisclosure violates due process under Brady 
only if the evidence at issue is material and exculpatory, and if 
the defense did not become aware of the evidence until after 
trial. See Baaley, 473 U.S. at 678; Aaurs, 427 U.S. at 103; 
Mullins, 22 F.3d at 1371; see also supra note 1. Accordingly, 
even assuming that the cooperation agreements alleged here by 
Bisner actually existed—and observing that their substance would 
qualify by definition as Brady material for its impeachment 
value, see Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154-55—the State's nondisclosure 
of such evidence necessitates reversal only upon a determination 
that the defense was never afforded an opportunity to impeach 
Lyman with the information because the defense did not become 
aware of it until after Bisner's trial ended. 
137 Importantly, there is no question in this case that the 
defense knew days before trial about the State's alleged 
agreement to reduce the jail sentence and fine imposed in Lyman's 
unrelated misdemeanor in exchange for his testimony in Bisner's 
trial. The defense itself admitted in its motion for a new 
trial: 
A few days prior to trial, . . . [a] defense 
investigator contacted Lyman to discuss his 
expected testimony and learned that at the 
time Lyman first spoke to police he had a 
pending misdemeanor charge, and that after he 
gave his statement [to the police], someone 
spoke to the judge on his behalf and he got 
eight days off of a ten day sentence, the 
dismissal of a fine[,] and "something else." 
Indeed, it was because he was aware of the possibility of this 
agreement with Lyman that Bisner's attorney was able to use this 
information extensively at trial in an attempt to impeach Lyman's 
testimony. Bisner's attorney asked Lyman whether he received 
"any sort of deal for . . . giving th[e] information" about what 
Bisner had said to him earlier that night, whether he had 
"talk[ed] [with the police] about getting out of some jail time 
if [he would] cooperate," and whether it was his "understanding 
that if [he] cooperate[d] and g[a]ve a statement to the police[,] 
that [he] would not have to serve . . . eight [additional] days" 
in jail. In fact, Lyman conceded during this questioning that he 
had received a reduction in his sentence, stating that he had to 
serve only "two days [in jail] instead of ten" and that he 
"apparently" also avoided an imposition of a fine for his 
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".Teissier* :: the misdemeanor. As a consequence, Bisr.er' s :.a:r. 
that: his due process rights were violated by the State's failure 
to disclose this alleged agreement with Lyman is wholly without 
merit. Not only does the defense admit that it knew about this 
alleged agreement days before trial, but Bisner's attorney 
actually used the information for the precise purpose the 
Constitution requires its disclosure: impeachment. See Gialio, 
405 U.S. at 154-55. Therefore, the State's nondisclosure of its 
alleged agreement to seek a reduction in Lyman's misdemeanor 
sentence in exchange for his testimony does not constitute a 
Brady violation. See Mullins, 22 F.3d at 1371; Grossman, 943 
F.2d at 85; see also, e.g., United States v. Grinties, 237 F.3d 
876, 880 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Bradv applies only where the allegedly 
exculpatory evidence was not disclosed in time for the defendant 
to make use of it."); United States v. Adams, 834 F.2d 632, 634-
35 (7th Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d 
1131, 1141 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that the defendants' due 
process rights were not violated by the nondisclosure of evidence 
because the defense used the same evidence to impeach the 
witnesses at issue during trial) . 
138 Likewise, Bisner has no claim that the State's failure 
to disclose its alleged promise not to prosecute Lyman for drug 
distribution violated his right to a fair trial. While the 
record does not reflect the precise moment at which the defense 
became aware of this alleged promise, it is clear that the 
defense knew about the possibility of the inducement well before 
the trial concluded—at the very least, by the end of the State's 
case in chief. In the hearing on his motion to strike Lyman's 
testimony, held just after the State examined its last witness, 
Bisner's attorney specifically alleged it was his "view that 
[Lyman's] testimony indicates a de facto deal" on the State's 
part not to prosecute Lyman for drug distribution. Bisner's 
attorney stated further, "I believe that . . . Mr. Lyman was 
told, perhaps through counsel, that he would not be prosecuted 
for certain admitted drug distribution charges . . . ." In 
response, counsel for the State acknowledged that he had told 
Lyman's attorney that the State "wouldn't be able to prosecute 
[Lyman] because [the State] had no evidence other than his 
statements that there was a crime committed." However, despite 
the State's acknowledgment in this regard—and despite Bisner's 
assertion that Lyman had received a "de facto deal" of 
nonprosecution in exchange for his testimony—the defense utterly 
failed to make use of this knowledge during trial. Following the 
hearing on his motion to strike Lyman's testimony, Bisner could 
have recalled Lyman as a witness to question him specifically 
about the nature of the alleged "de facto deal" guaranteeing that 
the State would not prosecute him for drug distribution. Bisner 
similarly could have sought a continuance or recess in order to 
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rut the defense did not capitalize en either of these 
possibilities. Instead, when asked by the trial court whether it 
wished to call any witnesses, the defense declined, noting that 
it was ''satisfied with the state of the evidence.'' Consequently, 
we. hold that because the defense was afforded a full opportunity 
"to make use of the . . . disclosed information," but failed to 
do so, the State's nondisclosure of its alleged promise not to 
prosecute Lyman did not violate Bisner's due process rights. 
Adams, 334 F.2d at 635; see also Grinties, 237 F.3d at 330 
(holding that no Brady violation occurred where the defendant 
failed to use the allegedly exculpatory information disclosed 
during trial); Muliins, 22 F.3d at 1371-72 (finding no Brady 
violation where information "was known" by the defendant "in time 
for him to attempt to make use of it")-; United States v. Ramirez, 
310 F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1987) (same).' 
3. Nondisclosure of the Alleged 
Agreements with Koontz, Pearson, and Svmes 
139 Bisner also claims that the State violated his due 
process rights under Bradv by failing to disclose leniency 
agreements it allegedly entered into with Koontz, Pearson, and 
Symes concerning the charges they faced for their actions in the 
events leading to Golub's death. However, Bisner failed to 
properly preserve this claim at the trial level, and thus waived 
his right to raise the issue on appeal. While Bisner did move 
for a new trial on the basis that the State had failed to 
disclose the inducements it allegedly offered Lyman for his 
testimony, Bisner never properly raised before the trial court 
his assertion, made now on appeal, that the State also failed to 
disclose cooperation agreements it allegedly entered into with 
Koontz, Pearson, and Symes. Indeed, the only time Bisner ever 
brought the issue of the alleged agreements with Koontz and 
Pearson before the trial court was in his December 1, 1999, 
motion requesting that the court reconsider its decision denying 
his initial motion for a new trial. Significantly, the trial 
court never ruled on this motion to reconsider, as Bisner filed 
his notice of appeal on Deceniber 30, 1999, divesting jurisdicticn 
from the trial court. See Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. 
Foothills Water Co., 942 P.2d 305, 306 (Utah 1996) (holding that 
filing notice of appeal "divests the trial court of jurisdiction 
and transfers it to the appellate court''); see also Cheves v. 
Williams, 1999 UT 86, i 45, 993 P.2d 191; White v. State, 795 
P.2d 643, 650 (Utah 1990). In fact, we have already ruled in 
this case that the trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider 
Bisner's motion to reconsider since Bisner filed notice of appeal 
before the trial court could enter a final order on the issue. 
See suora % 29 ("Defendant's motion to dismiss this appeal 
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•vimcur prejudice while the trial court ccnsiders oefer.iar.t' s 
action to reconsider . . . 13 denied. . . . The trial court 
iac!<s jurisdiction to consider anything further in tnis case 
because defendant timely filed his notice of appeal on 
December 30, 1999."). Similarly, Bisner did not argue even once 
to the trial court that the State had failed to disclose a 
cooperation agreement with Symes.2 Accordingly, because Bisner 
failed to preserve the issue below, he cannot now claim that the 
State violated his due process rights by failing to disclose 
alleged leniency agreements with Koontz, Pearson, and Symes. See 
State v. Holaate, 2000 UT 74, 1 11, 10 P.3d 346 P[C]laims not 
raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal. . . . 
[This] preservation rule applies to every claim, including 
constitutional questions . . . . " ) ; Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 
1017, 1022 (Utah 1996) (holding that constitutional claims not 
raised in the district court are deemed to be waived)/ see also 
State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, 1 29, 974 P.2d 269; State v. Locez, 
336 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994). 
1140 Moreover, even if Bisner did not waive his right to 
raise the issue on appeal, the State's nondisclosure of its 
alleged leniency agreements with Koontz, Pearson, and Symes did 
not violate Brady. As with the inducements allegedly promised to 
Lyman, the State's alleged leniency agreements with Koontz, 
Pearson, and Symes fall within Brady's purview solely for their 
impeachment value. See Gialio, 405 U.S. at 154-55. However, 
both Koontz and Pearson admitted at trial that they had pled 
guilty to reduced misdemeanor charges despite the fact that they 
had initially been charged with felonies, and Symes testified at 
Bisner's preliminary hearing that the State would inform his 
sentencing judge that he had testified cooperatively in Bisner's 
2
 In fact, even Bisner's December 1, 1999, motion to 
reconsider addressed only the testimony of Lyman, Koontz, and 
Pearson. Yet two months after Bisner filed his motion to 
reconsider, he submitted to the trial court a document entitled 
''supplement to record of motion for new trial," which included a 
transcript of Symes's sentencing hearing that Bisner now relies 
on in support of his argument that Symes entered into a leniency 
agreement with the State. However, at no point in this 
''supplement" does Bisner ever assert that the alleged agreement 
between Symes and the State violated his due process rights. 
Instead, as explained above, Bisner so argues for the first time 
on appeal. See supra 1 39. Further, Bisner submitted this 
"supplement" to the trial court on February 1, 2000—more than a 
month after he filed his notice of appeal on December 30, 1999, 
and thus well after the trial court had been divested of 
jurisdiction to consider the matter. See supra 1 39. 
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rase. Specifically, Koontz acknowledged chat he had been charcec 
with "murder" but "ended up pleading to attempted rioting, class 
A, and a class 3 assault." Pearson likewise testified that he 
had been charged with "felony riot" but "pled guilty to . . . a 
"class 3 and a class A . . . attempted riot and simple assault." 
And Symes testified that the State had agreed to "[i]nfcrm the 
court cf my testimony and [that] I was cooperative" following his 
appearance as a witness in Bisner's case- Accordingly, because 
the necessary information from which the credibility of their 
testimony could be questioned actually came out at trial and 
before, the State cannot be said to have withheld exculpatory 
information. The defense could have further exposed any 'r 
potential leniency agreements with the smallest amount of 
"reasonable diligence" by simply asking Koontz and Pearson why 
their charges had been reduced, and Symes had already disclosed 
the nature of his agreement with the State in the presence of 
Bisner's attorney and while under oath. See United States v. 
Campaanuolo, 592 F.2d 852, 361 (5th Cir. 1979); see also, e.g., 
Grinties, 237 F.3d at 880; Jarrell v. Balkcom. 735 F.2d 1242, 
1258 (11th Cir. 1984). Given these circumstances, the defense 
reasonably should have known of the possibility of the alleged 
agreements, as Bisner's attorney possessed the "essential facts 
permitting [Bisner] to take advantage of any exculpatory 
evidence" related to Koontz's, Pearson's, and Symes's testimony. 
Rector, 120 F.3d at 560. Thus, no Brady violation could have 
occurred. See United States v. Zackson, 6 F.3d 911, 919 (2d Cir. 
1993) (rejecting a claim of a Brady violation because the 
defendant "was . . . aware that [a witness's] cooperation may 
have warranted some additional investigation"); United States v. 
Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1991) ("When . . . a 
defendant has enough information to be able to ascertain the 
supposed Brady material on his own, there is no suppression by 
the government."); see also, e.g., United States v. Perdomo, 929 
F.2d 967, 973 (3d Cir. 1991); LeRoy. 687 F.2d at 618.3 
3
 Bisner also urges that the State's failure to disclose its 
alleged cooperation agreements with Koontz, Lyman, Pearson, and 
Symes violated his constitutional right to confront these 
witnesses and his discovery rights pursuant to Utah Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 16(a). However, Bisner did not lodge these 
arguments before the trial court. Thus, he has waived his right 
to raise them on appeal. See State v. Holaate, 2000 UT 74, 1 11, 
10 P.3d 346; State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, 1 29, 974 P.2d 269; 
Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996); State v. 
Locez, 386 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994). 
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II. CONSENT TO SEARCH 
541 3isner's second contention en appeal is that the trial 
rourt erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence 
removed from his living quarters in his mother's basement, 
namely, the assault rifle used to kill Golub. Bisner premises 
this contention on the argument that the warrant employed to 
confiscate the assault rifle was ineffective because the 
information used to secure the warrant was obtained 
unconstitutionally. Specifically, Bisner asserts (1) that his 
mother did not give Officer Severson "voluntary consent to 
conduct [the] . . . search" of her home immediately following 
Bisner's arrest, and (2) that the subsequent search conducted by 
Detective Soper also was unconstitutional since the written 
consent given by Bisner's mother was involuntary, as it "was 
obtained by exploiting the prior unlawful, warrantless search." 
142 The question of whether a par-y has consented to a 
search is a question of law, and we th^.efore review it for 
correctness. State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995); 
see also Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 
1990). Conversely, we will reverse the trial court's factual 
findings only if they are clearly erroneous. Harmon, 910 P.2d at 
1199; see also State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990). 
In determining whether a trial court's factual findings are 
clearly erroneous, we reject those findings that are not 
"supported by substantial, competent evidence." Arroyo, 796 P.2d 
at 687. 
A. Applicable Law 
143 Warrantless searches are per se unconstitutional under 
the Fourth Amendment unless conducted pursuant to a recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement. Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 353 (1967); State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 
1992). One such exception includes searches conducted pursuant 
to consent. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1982); 
State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 179 (Utah 1983). However, for a 
consent search to be valid, consent must have been given 
voluntarily and not have been "obtained by police exploitation of 
. . . prior illegality." State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 
(Utah 1993) . 
544 In support of his contention that his mother did not 
voluntarily consent to Officer Severson's initial search of her 
house, Bisner urges that consent is voluntary only if 
"(1) [t]here [is] clear and positive 
testimony that the consent was 'unequivocal 
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ana specific' and 'freely and intelligently 
given'; (2) the government . . . prove[s] 
consent was given without duress or coercion, 
express or implied; and (3) . . . there [is] 
convincing evidence that [the party] waived 
[its constitutional right against 
unreasonable searches and seizures]," 
State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citations 
emitted). This test for determining.voluntariness was adopted by 
the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 830, 
337-39 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), and has been applied.in myriad of 
that court's cases over the past decade.4 While this test 
correctly requires absence of duress or coercion for consent to 
be deemed voluntary, it also mandates a showing that the 
consenting party affirmatively waived its constitutional right 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. See Ham, 910 P.2d at 
439. In fact, in adopting this test the court of appeals 
expressly relied on the Tenth Circuit's decision in Villano v. 
United States, 310 F.2d 680, 684 (10th Cir. 1962), which also "c 
required affirmative waiver for consent to be voluntary. 
1145 However, eleven years after the Tenth Circuit handed 
down Villano, the United States Supreme Court flatly rejected the 
requirement that the prosecution establish waiver in order to 
demonstrate voluntariness. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the 
Court held: "Nothing, either in the purposes behind requiring a 
'knowing' and 'intelligent' waiver of trial rights, or in the 
practical application of such a requirement suggests that it 
ought to be extended to the constitutional guarantee against 
unreasonable searches and seizures," 412 U.S. 213, 241 (1973). 
Consequently, the Court ruled that voluntariness must be 
determined, not from a demonstration of waiver, but from "the 
totality of all the circumstances." Id. at 227. 
146 As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Schneckloth, the Tenth Circuit has since abandoned the Villano 
test. S^e United States v. Price, 925 F.2d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 
1991) ("In light of the Schneckloth decision, we . . . find . . . 
the Villano test's application of the presumption against waiver 
improper."). Likewise, this court has itself repeatedly followed 
4
 See, e.g.. State v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, M 18-25, 17 
P.3d 1135; Ham, 910 P.2d at 439; State v. Genovesi, 871 P.2d 547, 
551 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 467 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992); 
State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State 
v. Stercer, 308 P.2d 122, 127 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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the Sohr.eckloth "totality of all the circumstances'' analysis :r. 
lieu of any potential waiver test. See, e.g., Harmon. 910 ?.2i 
at 1206; State v. Dunn, 350 p.2d 1201, 1217-13 (Utah 1993); 
Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1262-63; Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 639. Indeed, 
this court must follow Schneckloth/s interpretation of consent 
under the Fourth Amendment, for the United States Supreme Court 
has been vested with final authority in interpreting the federal 
Constitution since the inception of our republic.5 See U.S. 
Const, art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1; Marburv v. Madison. 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."). 
547 Accordingly, to the degree it hinges consent upon 
waiver--and to the extent our prior cases have not made our 
position perfectly clear—we today explicitly reject the court of 
appeals' voluntariness test as enunciated in Marshall and its 
progeny. When assessing whether consent to a warrantless search 
was given voluntarily, courts in Utah must follow the same 
analysis we have repeatedly applied since Schneckloth: Consent 
is not voluntary if it is obtained as "the product of duress or 
coercion, express or implied," Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227; see 
also, e.g.. Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1206/ State v. Whittenback, 621 
P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). Factors indicating a lack of duress 
or coercion, which should be assessed in the "totality of all the 
surrounding circumstances/' include 
1) the absence of a claim of authority to 
search by the officers; 2) the absence of an 
exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a 
mere request to search; 4) cooperation by the 
owner of the [property]; and 5) the absence 
5
 In addition to his claim that the searches at issue 
violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the federal 
Constitution, Bisner claims that the searches also constituted 
violations of his rights pursuant to article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. However, Bisner neither proffers any 
explanation as to how this court's analysis should be conducted 
under this section nor cites even one case in support of this 
argument. We have repeatedly reminded that this court "'is not 
simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the 
burden of argument and research."' State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 
439, 450 (Utah 1988) (quoting Williamson v. Oosahl, 416 N.E.2d 
733, 784 (111. App. Ct. 1981)); see also MacKav v. Hardv, 973 
P.2d 941, 948 n.9 (Utah 1998). Accordingly, we decline to 
address this claim separately. State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, 1 12 
n.3, 999 P.2d 7. 
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officer. 
Whitter.hack. 621 P.2d at 106; see also Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1206. 
3. Consent for Officer Severson's Search 
^4 3 Applying these factors to the case at hand, we new turn 
to the question of whether Bisner's mother voluntarily consented 
to Officer Severson's search. Bisner asserts that the police 
coerced his mother's consent to this search by making a "shew of 
authority" and an "exhibition of force," which in turn 
transformed their petition to search her house into "more than a 
'mere request' to search." Specifically, Bisner argues that the 
police exhibited force and showed authority by having "several 
uniformed officers" present during Bisner's'arrest, by 
"physical[ly] touching" Bisner and drawing their weapons while 
taking him into custody, by stepping "inside the front door [of 
the house] before asking permission to search," and by telling 
3isner's mother and sisters to stay in their kitchen while .„... 
Officer Severson searched the house. 
1149 Despite Bisner's contention to the contrary, however, 
the officers' actions directed at him during his arrest are 
wholly irrelevant to whether the officers exhibited force toward 
his mother. While we do review the totality of the circumstances 
in assessing whether the officers used duress or coercion to 
obtain consent to search, that examination is limited to whether 
duress or coercion was exerted on the person who consented to the 
search, Bisner's mother, not to an entirely separate person, 
3isner. See Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1206-08; Thurman. 846 P.2d at 
1262-63. Moreover, Bisner does not challenge the trial court's 
factual findings in respect to the search, and those findings 
indicate that the officers did not exhibit force against Bisner's 
mother during her son's arrest: The officers telephoned Bisner 
from outside the house, requesting that he come outside and 
surrender himself, which he did. When Bisner exited the house, 
the officers had their weapons drawn, but they were pointed at 
3isner, not at his mother. Indeed, Bisner's mother remained in 
her house throughout Bisner's arrest. And when Officer Severson 
and his assisting officer approached the house, their guns were 
holstered, where they remained throughout the officers' 
discussion with Bisner's mother. 
150 Similarly, there is no indication that the officers' 
possible stepping inside the house's front door constituted a 
"show of authority" as Bisner contends. In support of this 
argument, Bisner relies entirely on Officer Severson's statement 
that he "was just inside the door" when he asked Bisner's mother 
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::r :.er rorsent to search. However, 3isner takes this statement 
cut of context in order to assert that Officer Severson entered 
the house intending to search before asking permission to do so. 
In fact, Officer Severson repeatedly characterized the discussion 
he had with Bisner's mother as occurring "at the door7' of the 
house. When asked where their discussion took place, Officer 
Severson stated, "We were at the door.'' He also averred that 
their discussion occurred "on the front of the step" of the house 
and "on the porch." Indeed, when stating that their discussion 
may have gone on inside the house, Officer Severson testified 
that he "d[id]n't remember if [he] was inside" the house, but 
that "if [he] was inside, [he] was just inside the. door"--a 
conclusion entirely in conformity with his other statements that 
the discussion occurred "at the door." Importantly, these 
statements amply support the trial court's factual finding that 
Officer Severson merely "spoke to [Bisner's mother,] who 
identified herself as the home owner," in an effort to tell her 
that "he wanted to make a cursory search of her home," not that 
he barged into her home without permission as Bisner implies. 
1151 Finally, the record does not support Bisner's argument 
that the "police used 'commanding language'" by "ordering [his] 
family to stay in the kitchen during [Officer Severson's] 
search." Although Officer Severson testified that he and his 
accompanying officer "had all of the family members stay up in 
the kitchen and living room area," nothing in his testimony 
indicates that he "commanded'' or "ordered" them to do so. 
Rather, the only testimony Bisner cites in support of this 
contention is his mother's. But she simply stated that she had 
asked the police' if she could accompany them on their search, 
since she was afraid their presence would "frighten [her] mother 
[who was] in bed." When the officers declined her request, she 
opened the door to her mother's bedroom and stated, "[M]om, stay 
calm. Just stay in bed. . . . [T]he police are here." 
Subsequently, the police "told [her] to go back in the kitchen." 
Again, nothing in these statements indicates that Officer 
Severson "commanded" or "ordered" Bisner's family members to 
remain in their kitchen in an effort to coerce Bisner's mother 
into consenting to the search. To the contrary, Officer Severson 
specifically testified that Bisner's mother had told the officers 
to "go ahead" with their search. Moreover, the statements of 
both Officer Severson and Bisner's mother in regard to the 
officers' instructions that the family should stay in the kitchen 
reflect, not the officers' use of authority and force, but their 
desire to protect Bisner's family, as the officers "believed that 
three [suspects] were in custody [but that] one was still 
outstanding" and may have been inside the house. 
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Zzl Therefore, having examined -he recorn m ::.e ciiali-y 
of the circumstances, we conclude chat the trial court properly 
found the police officers made no showing of force or authority, 
but merely requested permission to search. See Whittenback, 621 
?.2d at 106. As a result, we hold that Bisner's mother 
voluntarily consented to Officer Severscn's search of her home. 
See Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1203. 
C. Consent for Detective Sooer's Search 
K53 Bisner also argues that the written consent from 
Bisner's mother for Detective Soper's subsequent search of the 
house was given involuntarily.. However, Bisner does not argue 
that the police exercised duress or coercion in securing this 
consent, only that it "was obtained by exploiting the prior 
unlawful, warrantless search.'' While Bisner correctly states 
that consent obtained "by exploitation of . . . prior police 
illegality" may be deemed involuntary under certain conditions, 
e.g., State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990), we have 
already determined in this case that the search by Officer 
Severson was entirely proper and legal. See supra 11 48-52. 
Consequently, we find Bisner's argument that the consent for 
Detective Soper's search was given involuntarily to be without 
merit, and thus, hold that the trial court did not err in denying 
his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his living 
quarters in his mother's basement, 
III. PRIOR BAD ACTS EVIDENCE 
154 Bisner's third contention on appeal is that the trial 
court erred by denying his motion to exclude evidence of the drug 
debt Golub owed him. We review a trial court's decision to admit 
evidence of prior crimes or other bad acts under an abuse of 
discretion standard. State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, 1 42, 23 
P.3d 1278; State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, 1 18, 993 P.2d 837, 
cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1164 (2000). "However, in the proper 
exercise of that discretion, trial judges must 'scrupulously' 
examine the evidence before it is admitted." Widdison, 2001 UT 
60 at 1 42 (quoting Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at 1 13). 
155 Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits admission of 
"[ejvidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts" if offered "to prove 
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith." Utah R. Evid. 404(b). Such evidence, however, is 
admissible to prove "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident'' so 
long as it is also relevant and more probative than prejudicial. 
Id.; see Utah R. Evid. 402, 403. Accordingly, when deeming 
evidence of prior bad acts admissible, the trial court must first 
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determine "hat -he evidence is being offered fcr a prccer, 
noncharacter purpose under one of rule 404(b)'s listed 
exceptions; that it "'tends to prove seme fact that is material 
to the crime charged . . . other than the defendant's propensity 
to commit crime'"; and that the evidence's procativeness in this 
regard is not substantially outweighed by its pre]udicial impact. 
State v. Melson-Waqqoner, 2000 UT 59, f 26, 6 P.3d 1120 (quoting 
Decorso, 1999 rJT 57 at 1 22); see also State v. Mead, 2001 UT 53, 
15 61-64, 27 P.3d 1115; Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at M 20-23; Utah R. 
Evid. 402, 403, 404(b). 
156 In this case, Bisner argues that evidence of Golub's 
drug debt to him "was not relevant because the shooting and 
confrontation [at the strip mall] were unrelated to any alleged 
drug deal." Therefore, Bisner contends, evidence of the drug 
debt was inadmissible because* it could only prove his propensity 
to commit crime, and was thus "unfairly prejudicial, confusing[,j 
and misleading." Conversely, the State advanced the position at 
trial that the drug debt owed by Golub provided Bisner with the 
motive and intent to assault and kill Golub. In support of this 
theory, the State questioned Lyman about his meeting with Bisner 
just prior to Golub's death, and the following colloquy occurred: 
Q: What else was said by Mr. Bisner? 
A: He mentioned that someone owed him a 
small amount of money/ $300, something in 
that area, and that they were going to be 
meeting with this individual that night. 
Q: He say anything else about that? 
A: Yeah . . . , kind of on the way out he 
said, "Somebody is going to die tonight" 
In addition to Lyman's testimony, Pearson and Symes stated at 
trial that Bisner had informed his friends at the party that 
Golub owed him $350 for drugs. Bisner moved the trial court to 
exclude this evidence, but the court ruled that it was admissible 
to demonstrate "the purpose of th[e] gathering that resulted in 
Golub's death." 
H57 We agree with the trial court that the evidence of the 
drug debt between Bisner and Golub was admissible under rule 
404(b). There was no question in this case about Bisner's 
identity or acts. The only question for the jury was whether 
Bisner killed Golub intentionally or, as the defense asserted, 
was instead acting "under an extreme emotional disturbance" 
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:i-se: cv r.is crug use earlier in the evenina. Evidence :f tr.e 
drug cect therefore was not introduced to establish Bisner's 
propensity to commit crime, but was admissible for the 
noncharacter purpose of proving his motive and intent in killing 
Golub. See State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 134", 1351-52 (Utah 193"*'. 
'553 Similarly, evidence of the drug debt was relevant as to 
motive and intent. Evidence is relevant under 404(b) if it 
xx
'tends to prove some fact that is material to the crime 
charged.'" Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59 at f 26 (quoting Decorso, 
1999 UT 57 at 1 22). Here, Lyman's testimony, particularly when 
buttressed by the testimony of Pearson and Symes, tended to prove 
the material fact of Bisner's motive by presenting the jury with 
a reason Bisner had to kill Golub, thus making "more plausible 
. . . the State's theory that he did s'o intentionally rather 
than" under a drug-induced emotional disturbance. Pearson, 94 3 
P.2d at 1351; see also Mead, 2001 UT 58 at f 63; Nelson-Waggoner, 
2000 UT 59 at 1 27. 
159 Finally, the probative value of the drug debt evidence 
was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact. As 
explained above, evidence of Golub's drug debt to Bisner was 
highly probative of Bisner's motivation to kill Golub 
intentionally—especially given that Bisner mentioned the debt 
repeatedly during the night of Golub's death and that he also 
told Lyman, "Somebody is going to die tonight." Moreover, 
Bisner's prior crime, selling illegal drugs, was quite minor in 
relation to the crimes with which he was charged, first degree 
felonies of murder and aggravated robbery. See Decorso, 1999 UT 
57 at 1 34. The evidence also "did not suggest a proclivity for 
violence or even a significant criminal character," as it 
reflected only that Bisner had sold Golub $350 in drugs. 
Pearson, 943 P.2d at 1351. Indeed, these factors all suggest 
that the evidence was not prejudicial in proving Bisner's bad 
character, but was relevant to the issues of motive and intent. 
Id. at 1351-52; see also State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 
(Utah 1988) (explaining factors that should be considered in 
determining whether prior bad act evidence is more probative than 
prejudicial). Consequently, we hold that the trial court did net 
abuse its discretion in denying Bisner's motion to exclude 
evidence of Golub's drug debt to him. 
IV. MANSLAUGHTER JURY INSTRUCTION 
560 Bisner next contends that the trial court erred by 
giving over his objection jury instruction 25. That instruction, 
which related to the necessity of convicting Bisner for 
manslaughter rather than murder if he was found to have been 
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acting uncer an extreme emoticna-. disturcance," state:: in 
pertinent part: 
For manslaughter to apply, the "extreme 
emotional disturbance'' must be triggered by 
something external to the accused, and his 
reaction to such external stimulus must be 
reasonable. The terms used must be given the 
meaning you would give them in common 
everyday use. Such disturbance, therefore, 
cannot have been brought about by the 
defendant's own peculiar mental processes or 
by his own knowing or intentional involvement 
in a crime. 
Bisner asserts that this instruction "is confusing'' because it 
implies that manslaughter excludes "all knowing and intentional 
homicides, even when the accused suffers from an extreme 
emotional disturbance." 
f61 Despite Bisner's argument, we recently upheld a 
manslaughter instruction that used language identical to 
instruction 25. Unanimously rejecting a challenge that the 
instruction at issue erroneously directed "the jury that 
manslaughter cannot involve a knowing or intentional mental 
state," we held: 
[Defendant]'s argument confuses knowledge and 
intent in causing the death of the victim 
with knowing or intentional involvement in a 
crime which in turn brings about an extreme 
emotional disturbance. The instruction 
merely explains that the manslaughter statute 
excludes defendant's intentional involvement 
in a crime from the class of circumstances 
that can give rise to an extreme emotional 
disturbance which mitigates murder to 
manslaughter. 
State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 872 (Utah 1998) (emphasis in 
original). Given our holding in Piansiaksone, we reiterate today 
what we have repeatedly held in the past: that "[t]hose asking 
us to overturn prior precedent have a substantial burden of 
persuasion." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994). 
Indeed, "[t]his burden is mandated by the doctrine of stare 
decisis," and to convince us that a previous rule should be 
overturned, an appealing party must clearly demonstrate " 'that 
the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because 
of changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by 
27 No. 20000026 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
iecar-ir.g :r:~ precedent.'" I^ L at 398, 399 'quoting -John Har.r.: 
The Pole of Precedent in Judicial Decision, 2 7111. L. Rev. 3 6"*, 
367 ?1957)) . In this case, Bisner's argument that the 
manslaughter instruction "is confusing/' which he bolsters with 
absolutely no case law, statutory analysis, or other legal 
•V. MERGER 
562 Finally, Bisner challenges the trial court's refusal to 
merge his convictions for aggravated robbery and murder. 
Specifically, Bisner argues that section 76-1-402(3) of the Utah 
Code, which states that a "defendant may be convicted of an 
offense included in the offense charged but may not be convicted 
of both the offense charged and the included offense," Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1999), mandates that we "dismiss, or in the 
alterative[,] merge [his] aggravated robbery charge with the 
[felony] murder charge." Bisner's argument, however, must fail 
for at least two reasons. 
163 First, like Bisner's challenge to the manslaughter jury 
instruction given in this case, we have already decided the issue 
of whether the legislature intended the crime of felony murder to 
merge with the underlying felony of aggravated robbery. In State 
v. McCovey, we held: 
[T]he Utah State Legislature did not intend 
the multiple crimes of felony murder to be 
punished as a single crime, but rather, that 
the homicide be enhanced to second degree 
felony murder in addition to the underlying 
felony. To conclude otherwise would be to 
defeat the deterrent purpose of the felony 
murder statute and result in unjust 
consequences. A true lesser included 
relationship does not exist in the felony 
murder statute . . . . 
303 P.2d 1234, 1239 (Utah 1990). Asserting that McCovev does not 
apply to the case now before us, Bisner argues that McCovev "does 
not preclude [merger of aggravated robbery and felony murder] 
under the appropriate factual circumstances" because our holding 
in that case was "based largely on the existence of two separate 
victims." However, while we did note in McCovev that the 
existence of two different victims was one factor that 
distinguished the case factually from prior merger decisions, we 
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::: r.zz case cur interpretation of the felony murder statute en 
that distinction. Rather, we explicitly premised our holding on 
the legislature's intent in enacting the statute. Id.; see also 
id. at 1233 [noting that the modern felony murder statute differs 
in aim and purpose from the common law doctrine). Likewise, 
Eisner's reliance on our earlier decision in State v. Shaffer, 
"25 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986), is misplaced. Shaffer dealt with the 
merger of aggravated robbery and aggravated murder under Utah 
Code section 76-5-202 and is thus inapposite to Bisner's 
conviction here for murder under Utah Code section 76-5-203. Id. 
at 1313-14. 
164 Moreover, unlike McCovey, it is not undisputed in this 
case that Bisner was convicted for felony murder. See 803 P.2d 
at 1234 ("The fact that McCovey was convicted for second degree 
felony murder . . . is undisputed,"). The State charged Bisner 
with murder under three alternate theories—that he killed Golub 
intentionally or knowingly, that he did so with the intent to 
cause serious bodily injury to another, or that he did so while 
in the commission of aggravated robbery. Importantly, however, 
the State introduced overwhelming evidence at trial that Bisner 
killed Golub intentionally or knowingly: Bisner declared just 
hours prior to Golub's death that "[s]omebody is going to die 
tonight." When Bisner and his friends met Golub at the strip 
mall, Bisner assaulted Golub after Koontz and Symes had knocked 
him to the ground. Then, even though Bisner's friends withdrew 
and urged Bisner to join them, he remained. As this occurred, 
Golub, who had been disarmed, fled to his truck and began 
speeding away. Despite this fact, Bisner shot at Golub three 
times. When he realized his shots missed, Bisner fired three 
more rounds, killing Golub. This evidence was sufficient for the 
jury to find that Bisner killed Golub intentionally or knowingly. 
165 As a result, we hold that, in accordance with our 
decision in McCovey, the trial court did not err by denying 
Bisner's motion to merge his convictions for aggravated robbery 
and murder. 903 P.2d at 1239. 
CONCLUSION 
166 The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
Bisner's motion for a new trial on due process grounds, nor did 
it err in admitting into evidence the assault rifle seized from 
Bisner's closet. The trial court also acted properly in denying 
3isner's motion to exclude evidence of the drug debt Golub owed 
him, in instructing the jury concerning manslaughter, and in 
refusing to merge Bisner's charges for aggravated robbery and 
murder. Accordingly, we affirm Bisner's convictions as entered 
below. 
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<[67 Chief Justice Howe, 
and Justice Wilkins concur in 
:c:m:n. 
Justice Durham, Justice Durrant, 
Associate Chief Justice Russcn's 
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